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Abstract—A predictive mechanism is proposed in order to
reduce price volatility linked to large fluctuations from de-
mand and renewable energy generation in competitive electricity
markets. The market participants are modelled as price-elastic
units, price-inelastic units, and storage operators. The distributed
control algorithm determines prices over a time horizon through
a negotiation procedure in order to maximize social welfare
while satisfying network constraints. A simple flow allocation
method is used to assign responsibility for constraint violations
on the network to individual units and a control rule is then
used to adjust nodal prices accordingly. Such a framework is
appropriate for the inclusion of aggregated household appliances
or other ‘virtual’ market participants realized through smart grid
infrastructure. Results are examined in detail for a 4-bus network
and then success is demonstrated for a densely-populated 39-bus
network. Formal convergence requirements are given under a
restricted subset of the demonstrated conditions. The scheme is
shown to allow storage to reduce price volatility in the presence
of fluctuating demand.
Index Terms—Price-based control, model predictive control,
dual decomposition, wind power, power flow allocation, electricity
pricing, nodal pricing, locational marginal pricing
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the liberalization of electricity markets, the simple top
down approach to power dispatch has been sacrificed for one
in which operators compete to provide the most cost-efficient
power. Under such a system an auction takes place in advance
for every time slot of the following day in order to determine
a scheduled price per MWh. However since this auction has
become heavily distorted in some countries by the preferential
treatment of an increasing contribution of wind power, the
current system increasingly fails to provide a sensible clearing
price. Other factors leading to price spikes include higher-
than-expected demand and unscheduled supply outages [1].
Importantly, the increasing use of wind power has also meant
a larger use of operating reserves to deal with the power
variation [2]. This means larger operating margins have to be
set aside in conventional generators, which adds expense and
reduces efficiency in terms of emissions per MWh.
The optimal dispatch problem has been studied since the
mid-20th century by grid operators, and much standard liter-
ature on the subject exists [3], [4]. Control of the network by
price signals has been studied since the work of Schweppe et
al. in 1980 [5]. Glavitsch and Alvarado [6], [7] have studied
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grid control using price mechanisms and points out that while
it may be possible to infer convex cost functions of generators
on the network, and therefore solve a central quadratic pro-
gram to derive optimal nodal prices, time varying costs and
shut-down/start-up events represent a major problem. This is
because all plants have costs associated with maintenance and
large changes in output which cannot be factored into a central
price controller; indeed it is those smaller generators used to
match peaks while the price is fluctuating most who are most
concerned with when to start up or shut down.
There has been recent interest in decentralizing the optimal
dispatch problem; [8] gives an account of the recent literature.
The dispatch problem is an optimization with a separable
cost function but with coupling constraints beween the nodes
due to the need to satisfy each load and respect line flow
limits. The solution can be approached using primal or dual
decomposition. The problem with the primal decomposition
approach is that it leads to setting power outputs from each
generator to satisfy loads. Furthermore if we were to attempt
a subgradient technique we would have to rely on Lagrange
multipliers to be returned from the local optimizations, which
in a market populated by selfish agents is not realistic. Neither
of these aspects are desirable in a competitive, price-based
environment.
More appropriately, dual decomposition (Lagrangian re-
laxation), where prices (Lagrange multipliers) are updated
based on constraint violation until feasibility is reached, as
demonstrated by [9]. Wang et al. [10] showed how a sched-
uled unit commitment problem could be solved by iterating
price and schedule updates, however the number of Lagrange
multipliers in the decomposition meant that the individual
market participants were made to perform obscure or non-
intuitive optimizations; this is a practical detraction from such
a scheme.
For real-time control (on the minutes-seconds scale), a sim-
pler strategy is required. Jokic´ et al. [11] have studied dynamic
optimal dispatch and designed a continuous-time decentralized
linear complementarity controller to satisfy power demands
and line constraints, and proved convergence to the optimal
solution under strong assumptions. They took minimization
of total costs to price-sensitive units as the objective, on the
grounds that this can be interpreted as a maximization of
social welfare [12]. The limitation however was that in practice
relying on real-time frequency droop as a control signal
assumes sufficient total machine inertia that grid synchronism
is not lost during the control action; no guarantees are made
in this respect. The scheme also employs a model in which
2frequency drops are local; it would be necessary for a real
control formulation to take the global system frequency as an
input to the controller.
The scheme in this paper is presented as an alternative
strategy to real-time price-based frequency control, with the
assumption that reserve services correcting frequency on very
short timescales would remain. It aims to match the price-
sensitive power with the predicted amount of price-insensitive
power at each step over a receding horizon, while respecting
all network constraints. Time steps are on the order of minutes.
At every time step, the negotiation scheme results in a new
generation schedule exploiting the latest predictions, with the
assumption that inelastic loads and supplies can be predicted
well. The optimization action at a single time step of such
a scheme is described in this paper, with implications for
receding horizon control to be explored in future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network
The lines in the electrical network are assumed to have small
resistance in comparison to their inductance. Consequently, a
network of lines connecting n nodes is defined here solely
by a per-unit susceptance matrix Σ ∈ Sn+. Each element σij
is the susceptance of the line connecting node i to node j.
σij = 0 implies nodes i and j are not connected directly,
although all nodes are at least connected via lines to other
nodes. There are no unpopulated leaf nodes on the network
graph. Relative phase angles between buses are assumed to
be small. Under these assumptions there are no line losses,
voltages are constant across the network, and the per-unit
power flow in steady state in the direction i to j is given
by:
Pij = σij(δj − δi) (1)
where δi is the phase angle at node i. Under this assumption,
given a set of power injections due to generators and a
matching set of loads, the real power flow can be determined
uniquely from Σ, see [13] for details. Reactive power transfers
are outside the scope of this paper.
B. Networked units
Many diverse consumers and producers are connected to
real electricity networks, as shown in Fig. 1. In this study,
we assume that they can be modelled using the three unit
types described mathematically below, either singly or in
combination. In this scheme, units do not consider their effects
on the network, but provide selfish optimizations for their
planned power draw or outputs given prices resulting from
a negotiation.
Price-elastic: These units can be generators or consumers,
and participant i performs an optimization of the following
form over a time horizon of T steps:
min
pi
Jei (pi)−λ
T
i pi :=
T∑
k=1
[
J˜i(pik)+αi(∆pik)
2−λikpik
]
(2a)
s. t. p
i
≤ pik ≤ pi, ∀k = 1, . . . , T, (2b)
∆p
i
≤ ∆pik ≤ ∆pi, ∀k = 1, . . . , T. (2c)
price
controller
elasticload & storage unit controller
inelastic load prediction
unidirectional communication channel
bidirectional communication channel
Fig. 1. Network supporting a diverse population of consumers and producers.
The conventional generators will be price-elastic, wind farms may be inelastic,
and households may have both inelastic and elastic demand components.
pi := [pi1 . . . piT ]
T is the vector of power outputs at each
time step, and λi := [λi1 . . . λiT ]T is the price schedule
over the horizon, which is given for each optimization, with
λik the price per unit of electrical energy, scaled for the
length of the time step used. J˜i(·) is the static cost function
of the participant; here we assume that the cost can be
represented adequately by a quadratic function, i.e. J˜i(p) :=
ai+ bip+
1
2cip
2
. For generators this comprises fuel and other
variable costs, and for consumers this represents the utility of
the power consumed. Real power pik is defined as positive
when injected into the grid. αi is a penalty for changes power
output, which are represented by ∆pik := pik − pi[k−1]. The
power at the time the optimization is performed is pi0. pi
and ∆p
i
are the (negative) lower bounds on power output
and change in power output respectively, and pi and ∆pi are
upper bounds. Scheduling decisions, such as shut-down/start-
up or load shifting, are outside the scope of this study. Here
me elastic units are present.
Price-inelastic: These units have a predicted power pro-
file pˆl := [pˆl1 . . . pˆlT ]T that cannot be influenced by price.
Examples include inelastic demand and any wind power not
taking part in active pricing mechanisms. Flows out of the
grid are defined as positive. Since their power profile cannot
be changed it is not meaningful to define a cost function for
them. Here mi inelastic units are present. Until convergence
to pˆl, values of these flows are denoted p˜l := [p˜l1 . . . p˜lT ]T.
Storage: In general the aim of operating storage is to profit
from selling power at a higher price than that for which it has
been bought. The optimization of the storage level schedule
for such a unit i is formulated as follows:
min
si
J si (si) + λ
T
i∆si :=
T∑
k=1
γi(sik − s
mid
i )
2 + λik∆sik (3a)
s. t. p
i
≤ sik − si[k−1] ≤ pi ∀k = 1, . . . , T, (3b)
si ≤ sik ≤ si ∀k = 1, . . . , T − 1, (3c)
siT = si0. (3d)
3where si := [si1 . . . siT ]T is the vector of storage levels for
the unit over the horizon, ∆sik := sik−si[k−1], γi is a penalty
for deviating from the midpoint smidi of the storage’s capacity,
p
i
and pi are as above, and si and si are the storage limits.
The storage level at the time the optimization is performed
is si0, and the last constraint ensures that storage is not
simply emptied at the end of the horizon: although this would
maximize income over this time horizon, it would only do so at
the expense of future income after time step T . Depending on
the characteristics of the storage unit, modifications to the form
given may be appropriate; the form given here is assumed for
simplicity. In any case the optimization should return a power
output profile from the optimal storage vector si found, given
(according to the price-elastic sign convention) by:
pik = −∆sik = si[k−1] − sik (4)
Here ms storage units are present. Note that storage and price-
elastic units perform differing optimizations but in each case
return a vector of power outputs given a vector of prices.
C. Global optimization
The global objective of the scheme to be solved using the
algorithm is, over a time horizon of T intervals, to minimize
total cost while satisfying power balance and network flow
constraints:
min
p1,...,pme+ms
me∑
i=1
Jei (pi) +
ms∑
i=1
J si (pi) (5a)
s. t. P e ≤ Pek ≤ P e, ∀e ∈ E , ∀k = 1, . . . , T, (5b)
me+ms∑
i=1
pik =
mi∑
l=1
pˆlk, ∀k = 1, . . . , T, (5c)
p˜lk = pˆlk, l = 1, . . . ,mi, ∀k = 1, . . . , T (5d)
where E := {(i, j) : σij 6= 0}, so that Pek is the appropriate
flow Pij as defined in (1) at time step k. P e and P e are the
lower and upper limits for real power flow in line e ∈ E ; for
symmetrical bi-directional lines P e = −P e. Condition (5d)
matches the power drawn by each price-inelastic unit to its
predicted value, as explained in section III. Note the abuse of
notation for cleanness, which groups the me elastic generators
in summations alongside the ms storage units.
The aim is to set prices λi such that the power outputs
pi minimize the cost function under the profit-maximization
strategies of the participants. If the Lagrangian of this problem
were written out and separated, the task would be to find a
set of prices that approximate the combination of optimal La-
grange multipliers arising from the constraints, and therefore
give optimal ‘selfish’ behaviour for each participant.
III. CONTROL SCHEME
A. Summary of the negotiation procedure
The negotiation contains six processes, which are illustrated
in Fig. 2.
1) Price initialization (price controller): An initial set of
nodal prices λ0 := λi(0) for the time horizon is passed
to each participant on node i.
2) Local optimization (price-sensitive units): Given their
current price vector at round j, denoted λi(j), price-
elastic units and storage operators perform local optimiza-
tions and commit to an optimal power schedule pi. This
is a draft schedule that is refined as prices are adjusted in
later negotiation rounds, but at each iteration pi should
be a feasible output commitment, such that if there are
no further price changes the output will be exactly pi.
3) Power flow computation: Flows are determined, either
centrally using the procedure in [13], or in a distributed
manner, see the Appendix. Mismatches are accommo-
dated until convergence by sharing the mismatch between
the inelastic generators or loads on the network. This can
be done proportionally (equal percentage mismatch):
p˜lk(j) = pˆlk +
|pˆlk|∑mi
i=1 |pˆik|
(
me+ms∑
i=1
pik(j)−
mi∑
i=1
pˆik(j)
)
(6)
or equally (equal absolute mismatch):
p˜lk(j) = pˆlk +
1
mi
(
me+ms∑
i=1
pik(j)−
mi∑
i=1
pˆik(j)
)
(7)
with little difference in performance.
4) Responsibility assignment (price controller): Imbalance
responsibilities φi,lk(j) ≥ 0 and line limit violations
responsibilities Φi,ek(j) ≥ 0 are allocated to the price-
elastic and storage units on the network, using an algo-
rithm due to Bialek [14]. Such an algorithm requires only
an assumption of thorough power mixing at each node,
and therefore does not discriminate against any partici-
pant. Details are given in section III-B. Assignment gives
a set of Φi,ek(j) and φi,lk(j) such that at negotiation
stage j:
me+ms∑
i=1
φi,lk(j) = 1, ∀(l, k) where plk 6= pˆlk, (8)
me+ms∑
i=1
Φi,ek(j) = 1,
∀(e, k) where (Pek > P e) ∨ (Pek < P e). (9)
5) Price updates (price controller): According to the results
of steps 3 and 4, price feedback is sent to each participant
according to the line overflows and load mismatches it
has caused, for each time period k:
λik(j + 1) := λik(j)
+
mi∑
l=1
κL(pˆlk, p˜lk(j), φi,lk(j))
+
∑
e∈E
κE(Pek(j), P e, P e,Φi,ek(j)) (10)
where κL : R × R × R+ → R and κE : R × R × R ×
R+ → R. pˆlk is the predicted inelastic load at node l
and time k, and φi,lk(j) is the fractional contribution of
elastic unit i to this load at negotiation round j. Φi,ek(j)
is the fractional contribution of unit i to flow Pek(j). The
forms chosen for the functions κL(·, ·, ·) and κE(·, ·, ·, ·)
4are discussed in the examples of section V. Convergence
results are given in section IV-A.
6) Convergence check (price controller): The new price
vector λi(j + 1) is sent to each elastic participant; in-
crement j and return to step 2 unless the constraints (5b)
and (5c) have been satisfied. Although the inequalities
(5b) are satisfied in a finite number of steps, the power
matches are reached asymptotically, so a tolerance ε is
chosen for the convergence check:∣∣∣∣plk(j)pˆlk − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε, l = 1, . . . ,mi, k = 1, . . . , T (11)
Qualitatively, the negotiation penalizes those at the wrong end
of a congested line with lower prices, and generators receive
lowered prices should there still be too much power scheduled
to the loads. If the negotiation starts from relatively high initial
prices, for example, more expensive generators will reduce
their power output as the price is driven down, and the process
converges to prices encouraging an efficient satisfaction of the
loads. Through the scheduling action, storage units are able
to perform arbitrage over price differentials as they emerge,
thereby reducing price volatility.
While trying to maximize social welfare as defined in (5a),
the scheme assumes no cooperation between producers or
consumers, and only easily-verifiable information is required
from them. We do, however, assume that participants can
easily calculate their power schedule based on a set of prices
over a discrete-time horizon, and that deviation from such an
agreed schedule would be prevented by sufficient penalties. We
also assume that price-inelastic power flows can be predicted
perfectly over the horizon used.
Fig. 2. Negotiation algorithm described in section III-A.
B. Details of allocation algorithm
There are several ways of assigning flows heuristically to
units on a network, since in reality it is never possible to say
whose generated power is being consumed elsewhere on a
network, even though it is simple to determine the power flows
in each line of the grid. Ng [15] and others have derived such
algorithms, but these can lead to negative distribution factors,
i.e. a generator can be given a negative responsibility for the
flow in a given line. Practically it is more acceptable to use
a method that gives only positive values, since in the price
feedback step of equation (10) we want to punish constraint
TABLE I
ASSIGNMENT OF FLOWS AND LOAD SUPPLY TO GENERATORS FOR THE
FLOWS SHOWN IN FIG. 3
MW Value G1 G2 G4
Flows: 1→ 2 517 517 0 0
1→ 3 483 483 0 0
3→ 2 183 60 0 123
4→ 3 1000 0 0 1000
Loads: Node 2 1700 577 1000 123
Node 3 1300 423 0 877
violation in an intuitive way. Therefore we choose a method
due to Bialek [14].
Consider the network of Fig. 3, the shape of which is the
same as used in [11]. For the line flow solution shown it is
straightforward to issue the assignments shown in Table I. The
algorithm is constructed from the assumption that power mixes
proportionally between incoming and outgoing flows at each
node. Now suppose that the flows are hypothetical and a lower
demand is predicted at node 2. This would require changes to
generator outputs. From the entries in Table I we can compute
φ1,2 =
577
1700 = 0.34, i.e. G1’s responsibility for mismatch at
load 2, and issue an appropriate price control signal to G1
using equation (10), and similarly calculate price signals for
the other generators.
G11000 MW G41000 MW
G21000 MW
1300 MW
1700 MW
1
2
3 4
517 MW 183 MW
483 MW 1000 MW
Fig. 3. Network flow state. Table I shows how these flows can be allocated
to the generators on the network.
IV. CONVERGENCE AND OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
A. Convergence
The strategy in this approach to the Optimal Power Flow
problem is that the problem of planning generators’ schedules
has been changed from a large-scale optimization into a prob-
lem of guaranteeing the convergence of a pricing algorithm.
One aim is for such a price control scheme to allow action
to be taken to force convergence such that a feasible solution
always emerges from the procedure, in order to guarantee that
operating constraints will be satisfied. As shown in section
V-B, convergence has been demonstrated in complex cases
with congested lines on a non-trivial network using such a
controller.
For the uncongested case with each J˜i(·) convex (i.e. ci >
0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,me), and without storage units, convergence
conditions for a negotiation with load imbalance feedback
as in equation (14) were determined. Generation limits are
assumed not to be hit. Although analysis of Bialek’s algorithm
5is difficult and only just furthered in [16], if the blame
coefficients φi,lk(j) are assumed equal, the following sufficient
condition on the price feedback coefficient KL for convergence
to a power balance is reached:
0 < KL < 2me
[
me∑
i=1
1
ci
]−1
(12)
In such a case, convergence to a power mismatch less than
magnitude  from a starting mismatch of magnitude 0 is
achieved, for β := KL
me
∑me
i=1
1
ci
, in Nconv steps, where
Nconv =
⌈
ln (/0)
ln |1− β|
⌉
, (13)
noting that both the numerator and denominator are negative.
This means that for a given network population, convergence
time has only a logarithmic dependence on the initial mismatch
0. For succintness, proofs of these results are not given here,
but are held along with further discussion at [17].
B. Optimality
In the example illustrated in section V-A, the nodes unaf-
fected by congestion are shown to have the same price. When
prices are equal across the network, convergence to a feasible
solution satisfying (5c) implies optimality. This is because
when the price is constrained to be equal amongst all loads,
the assumptions of section IV-A imply that total power output
during each time step is a strictly increasing linear function
of price. Since there is only one load here, there is only one
price that will satisfy this load. In other words, the feasible set
in this optimization is a singleton if all generators themselves
are acting optimally. In the more complex example of section
V-B, however, no such optimality guarantee can be made at
present.
It should be noted here, however, that continuous feasibility
(in other words, reliability) of flows over a power network
is more important than economic optimality, since network
failure has extremely serious consequences. This is seen in
present-day trading mechanisms, where the main priority is
to establish a clearing price in the day-ahead market, and
contingencies in real-time are regularly dealt with by telephone
commands. In the current market even the objective function
is a sum of private variables, so we cannot tell how optimal
a dispatch has been reached, even before management costs
and market power of the actors are considered.
Although convex cost functions have been considered in
the example above, it is not required that all cost functions
are convex for there to be a unique global optimal dispatch.
However when non-convex cost functions are present there
will be a duality gap for some optimal solutions. In other
words, there will be no set of prices (dual variables) which
will yield the global optimum. Indeed if enough of the units
have ‘bad’ cost functions there may even be no set of prices
that produces power flows satisfying the network constraints.
V. EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS
The negotiation procedure is shown in detail for a 4-bus
network, so that the mechanics can be examined. Then success
on a 39-bus network and storage effects are demonstrated.
TABLE II
TABLE OF NETWORK PARAMETERS FOR THE 4-BUS EXAMPLE
Param. Line 1-2 Line 1-3 Line 2-3 Line 3-4
σij 1/2 1 1/3 1/2
P e 1000 1000 1000 300
P e 1000 1000 1000 −300
TABLE III
TABLE OF GENERATOR PARAMETERS FOR THE 4-BUS EXAMPLE
Param. G1 G2 G4 Description
ai 0 0 0 Fixed cost
bi 2.5 2.0 1.7 Linear cost
ci 0.18 0.22 0.2 Quadratic cost
pi 1000 1000 1000 Upper power limit
p
i
0 0 0 Lower power limit
αi 0.1 0.1 0.1 Penalty for output changes
∆pi 200 200 200 Upper power change limit
∆p
i
−200 −200 −200 Lower power change limit
A. 4-bus network
A simple network with four nodes is used to demonstrate
the negotiation algorithm, as shown in Fig. 4. Three nodes
support price-elastic generators, and the fourth node supports
an inelastic load to be satisfied by the generators. Using the
previously-defined notation, me = 3, mi = 1, ms = 1. A
time step of τ = 15 minutes is used, with a time horizon
of T = 24 steps, i.e. 6 hours. This horizon is chosen on the
grounds that in a practical implementation of such a power
matching scheme, both demand and wind power outputs could
be predicted effectively over the period [18].
G1 G4
G2
L3
S2
1
2
3 4
j2Ω j3Ω
j1Ω j2Ω
Fig. 4. 4-bus network topology with line impedances and unit placement.
Table II gives the parameters for the 4-bus network, and
Table III gives the parameters for the price-elastic units. The
storage unit at node 2 has a capacity of 100 MWh and
a maximum power magnitude of 200 MW, with midpoint
deviation penalty γ = 0.12 e/(MWh)2.
For the price update rule in equation (10) we take:
κL(pˆlk, p˜lk, φi,lk) = KLφi,lk(pˆlk − p˜lk) (14)
and κE(Pek, P e, P e,Φi,ek)
= KEΦi,ek(max(P e−Pe, 0)−max(Pe−P e, 0)) (15)
where KL and KE are positive scalars determining how heav-
ily to act on load mismatches and line overflows respectively.
The value of (15) is non-zero only when the line is congested
in either direction. If the line is congested, unit i will be
penalised according to the proportion of the excess flow on
that line for which it has been assigned responsibility. Here
6KL = KE = 0.075 is used, consistent with the bounds given
in section IV-A. Convergence to final prices at node 1 is shown
over 15 steps in Fig. 6, and the final prices for all the price-
elastic units are shown in Fig. 7. Fig. 8 shows how the load
at node 3 is satisfied by the three generators plus storage unit;
the storage unit is shown to take advantage of price differences
across the horizon, buying at cheap times and selling at peak
demand.
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Fig. 5. 4-bus negotiation: Demand schedule for the load at node 3.
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Fig. 6. 4-bus negotiation: Price schedule evolution over the negotiation
procedure for node 1.
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Fig. 7. 4-bus negotiation: Final prices for each price-elastic unit.
High prices coincide with times of high power demand, and
the generator at node 4 receives a low price in comparison
to othe generators, since the price controller gives a price
disincentive that stops excess power overloading the line
between nodes 3 and 4. The bold line in Fig. 8 represents
the gross power output of the generators and storage unit
combined, and coincides as required with the demand profile
of Fig. 5.
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Fig. 8. 4-bus negotiation: Stacked power outputs showing how load at node
3 is satisfied. The bold line shows the storage flows relative to the sum of the
generator outputs (the stacked bars).
B. 39-bus network
The negotiation procedure has also been employed on larger
networks. As an example, the IEEE 39-bus network from [19]
shown in Fig. 9 is used here. Price-elastic generators are placed
at nodes 30-39, storage at nodes 31 and 38, and inelastic
units at nineteen other nodes. For compactness, the unit and
network parameters are not given here, but power constraints
are set for each line at 450 MW. The negotiation gives a flow
satisfying each of the loads’ schedules to within 2% within
50 iterations. Fig. 10 shows the final price schedule for the
nodes, and Fig. 11 shows the breakdown of the total power
provision between the price-sensitive units. Fig. 10 shows that
nodes 33 and 34 experience particularly low prices since any
power not drawn by the load at node 20 is transported entirely
by the single cosntrained line 16-19.
Fig. 9. 39-bus negotiation: Network topology showing populated nodes.
C. Effect of storage
The same 39-bus scenario was used to test the effect of
storage. Table IV shows how use of storage affects total
generation costs and nodal prices. The storage is split equally
between nodes 31 and 38. Although total generation costs
and average prices did not change significantly, price volatility
(measured by the standard deviation of the nodal price from
its average over the time horizon) is significantly decreased
by the introduction of storage.
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Fig. 10. 39-bus negotiation: Final price schedule.
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Fig. 11. 39-bus negotiation: Gross power breakdown. The bold line shows
the storage flows relative to the sum of the generator outputs (the stacked
bars).
TABLE IV
EFFECT OF STORAGE ON DISPATCH COST AND PRICE VOLATILITY
Total storage Dispatch cost Average price, Price s.d., node
(MWh) (Me) node 38 (e/MWh) 38 (e/MWh)
0 3.76 118.25 20.87
200 3.73 119.45 13.47
400 3.71 119.34 12.00
VI. IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS
The ICT requirements of the control scheme are straight-
forward to obtain and reasonable. Part of the control scheme
is inherently distributed over the participants. The centralized
price controller only needs to receive power profiles from each
unit at every negotiation iteration j. Profiles can be issued from
‘smart’ aggregators of domestic devices present at a node,
equivalent to a price-elastic unit. From this information, the
controller computes the new nodal price profiles for all nodes
and transmits them back. The only information the participants
need is the vector of length T nodal prices over the negotiation
horizon and some means of predicting their power needs. The
storage agents moreover need a measurement of their level
of storage. Each elastic or storage agent needs to solve a
problem of dimension T at each negotiation round, which
means the longest allowed computation period is the real price
update sampling period divided by the maximum number of
rounds. This means the number of iterations for acceptable
convergence need to be bounded. The flow equations can be
solved by the central price controller or by microcontrollers at
each node, as described in Appendix A. The price controller
needs to assign responsibilities to nodes and compute the
control law (10) for constraint violations.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A negotiation-based predictive pricing algorithm has been
employed to produce feasible power flows under selfish op-
eration of network agents. All price sensitive network agents
participate in the negotiation process in order to reduce power
peaks and price volatility. Price insensitive network agents are
modeled as predictable load profiles, such that price sensitive
network agents can optimize their production/consumption.
Simulation results show that load matching and line constraints
are satisfied for large networks populated by elastic, inelastic
and storage components. Analytical convergence results are
given for the algorithm under a strong set of assumptions.
As well as continued analysis of convergence and optimality
properties, several extensions to the scheme are planned. Of
particular interest are reserve margins, which can be priced in
the same framework by bringing the reserves into the local
constraints. Constraint (2b) would be changed and the reserve
price would appear in the local cost function. Each participant
then trades off reserve and real power offered. Reserves needed
are set by the grid operator, e.g. for N−1 reliability. Since at
present reserves are set conservatively and in far advance to
manage a wide range of contingencies [2], significant savings
could be made by using up-to-date state information to set
reserve levels more intelligently on a receding horizon basis.
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APPENDIX
Distributed determination of power flow
The solution of network flows can be framed as the opti-
mization problem (16), under the assumptions of section II-A:
min
δ
J =
n∑
i=1
Ji =
n∑
i=1

Gi − Li + V 2∑
j∈Ni
σij(δj − δi)


2
(16)
where δ = [δ1 . . . δn]T is the vector of n nodal phase angles,
Gi and Li are the generation (power injection) and load (power
extraction) at node i, and Ni is the set of all nodes directly
connected to node i. σij is the susceptance for lines connecting
node j ∈ Ni to node i, with j /∈ Ni ⇔ σij = 0. Clearly when
the objective function J = 0 the power balance at each node
is satisfied and we have a solution to the flows. The algorithm
used is the following:
1) For each node i, if Ji < 2, set a convergence flag for
node i. Unset if node i no longer satisfies this.
2) Set the phase angle δi such that power balance is
satisfied for that node. This is given by:
0 =
Gi − Li
V 2
+
∑
j∈Ni
σij(δj − δi)
⇒ δi =
[∑
j∈Ni
σij
]−1Gi − Li
V 2
+
∑
j∈Ni
σijδj

(17)
Note that applying rule (17) only requires infomation
on the local phase angles {δj | j ∈ Ni}, and that the
reciprocal of the sum can always be taken since every
node i has at least one neighbour.
Repeat steps 1 and 2 sequentially for each node.
3) If all nodes’ flags are set, the algorithm has converged
to within a total imbalance of magnitude less than n;
terminate the procedure. Otherwise return to step 1.
Convergence is reliable in practice, but an analysis is
outside this paper’s scope. If no comprehensive model of
the network even exists, as with the European UCTE, then
a decentralized solution based on local microcontrollers has
advantages, particularly if the initial guess, taken from the pre-
vious state, is already near to the correct solution. A solution
for the nonlinear equations, i.e. avoiding the approximation
sin(δj − δi) ≈ (δj − δi), is also possible in the same way,
except that (17) is replaced by a term involving phasor addition
of the sinusoids at adjacent nodes.
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